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This paper examines the level of protest activity by the unemployed in the United States between 1890 and 
1940 as a test of the value of a political process model for explaining social movement activity. Data on protest 
events and elite attitudes towards the unemployed were collected from newspaper articles. Voting behavior was 
used as an indicator of contested elections and unemployment levels were reflected by available indicators. Con- 
sistent with previous research on lower- and working-class mobilization, a change in the political environment 
was key to the extensive protest by the unemployed in the 1930s. Toward the end of the 1920s, and especially in 
the early 1930s, elites were no longer simply making public statements about the problem of unemployment, but 
were also discussing the need for aid programs. In the context of this new political environment, elections were 
once again contested in the 1930s, and extensive protest began in 1930, even before unemployment hit its high 
point in 1933. Thus, it was not simply deprivation, but the changed political environment which legitimized the 
issue of unemployment and created prospects for reform, which in turn helped produce the massive protest of the 
1930s. 
The primary goal of the research reported in this paper is to further understanding of the 
development, and lack of development, of protest by the unemployed in the United States 
between 1890 and 1940. The focus is on resource mobilization, and more specifically, on a 
political process perspective on the development of social movements, and the interaction 
between political environment and deprivation in the mobilization of social movement 
activities. 
We examine a specific condition (unemployment) likely to produce hardship, presuming 
that unemployment creates hardship for the vast majority of the unemployed. It could, of 
course, be argued that the pain of unemployment is eased somewhat in agricultural settings, 
or through the provision of extensive welfare benefits. For the period 1890 to 1940, however, 
neither of these factors had much effect on the impact of unemployment. By the 1890s, most 
of the labor force was urban (U.S. Bureau of Census 1975), and the best historical descriptions 
of unemployment during this time period do not credit welfare support or food resources from 
private lands as significant factors in reducing the impact of unemployment (Feder 1936; Gar- 
raty 1978.) Our approach overcomes some limitations of past research which typically fo- 
cused on all collective action events in a specified time period, often involving diverse issues 
and interest groups (Kerbo and Shaffer 1986; Snyder 1975:275; Tilly 1984). We examine a 
specific source of hardship affecting a segment of the population which can be followed over 
an extended time period in order to understand the changing parameters associated with 
collective action.' 
* Correspondence to: Kerbo, Social Sciences Department, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, 
CA 93407. 
1. In previous work we have argued for the use of "group analysis" over "event analysis" in the study of social 
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Resource Mobilization and a Political Process Model 
With a shift in sociological paradigms, and with empirical problems for deprivation theo- 
ries, the works by such theorists as McCarthy and Zald (1977), Oberschall (1973), and Gamson 
(1975) established the importance of a resource mobilization theory of social movements. The 
focal point of resource mobilization theory is a change in the balance of resources between 
insurgents and supporters of the status quo. When, for example, the defenders of the status 
quo become weaker and/or insurgents who have been locked out of the traditional political 
process gain resources with which to challenge the status quo, a social movement is likely to 
emerge or become stronger. Thus, in the resource mobilization perspective the level of depri- 
vation, especially economic deprivation, and frustration experienced by potential insurgents 
is rejected as a key source of social movements. More recently, the movement toward theo- 
retical maturity has brought with it criticism and a diversity of perspectives within a more 
general resource mobilization theory (e.g., see Kerbo 1982; Tarrow 1988). For example, it is 
now generally recognized that McCarthy and Zald (1977) initially went too far in rejecting the 
role of deprivation and other social psychological factors in helping generate social move- 
ments (Hirsch 1990; Klandermaus 1984; Oliver 1980). While some form of perceived depriva- 
tion is widespread in almost any society, as McCarthy and Zald stress, there are certainly 
changes in the level of this perceived deprivation which can help lead to insurgent mobiliza- 
tion (McAdam 1982). 
Equally important has been a trend toward greater recognition of political variables be- 
hind social movement activity, as first introduced by Piven and Cloward (1977) and Gamson 
(1975) (see Tarrow 1988:427). This "political process model" of social movements generally fits 
within a resource mobilization perspective, but focuses more on how changes in the political 
process can at times create new political opportunities for insurgents. For example, McAdam 
(1982:41) suggests that political elites may at times need to placate less powerful groups. Ac- 
cording to this approach, processes such as war; changes resulting from industrialization, in- 
ternational political realignments, and prolonged unemployment; and widespread 
demographic changes make the use of repression by political elites less likely (Goldstone 1980, 
1986). Tilly (1978) and Piven and Cloward (1977), on the other hand, focus more on how 
political competition can create political opportunities for insurgent mobilization. More spe- 
cifically, Tilly (1978) has stressed how social movement activities seem concentrated around 
highly contested elections. During these periods, potential movement activists may perceive 
that an increase in the number of movement participants can result in increased political 
opportunities. 
Piven and Cloward (1977) have stressed how political opportunities may be created when 
political competition has resulted from a major political party's decline. In this situation the 
declining party may give material and ideological support to lower class groups in order to 
broaden the party's voter constituency. Such support can enhance insurgent mobilization by 
legitimizing lower-class issues and reducing oppression which had previously made social 
movement organization and mobilization more difficult. 
Other recent critiques of the resource mobilization perspective have focused on the ne- 
glect of what may generally be called psychological variables in the mobilization process 
(Klandermans 1984; Oliver 1980). This criticism, which is especially directed toward the work 
by Olson (1965), stresses that people do not just respond to an objective change in the re- 
sources available to press for their interests with social movement activity. Social psychologi- 
cal processes must be activated and carried out in face-to-face interactions in order to mobilize 
movements. In contrast to studies which code all events of political violence or protest, no matter what the issue or 
background of the group involved (event analysis), we have focused on only one issue-unemployment-and protest 
only by people who are unemployed. "Group analysis" describes this method (following Snyder 1975), but, of course, the 
unemployed who are involved in protest over time do not form a specific and unchanging group in a strict sense. 
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participants (Hirsch 1990). In part, this psychological aspect of resource mobilization is in- 
cluded in what McAdam (1982) describes as "cognitive liberation" that allows social move- 
ment members to legitimize their demands in their own eyes, and thus makes them feel more 
justified to act. Klandermans (1984) also includes under these social psychological variables 
the expectation that others will get involved in the social movement and their estimation of 
the probability of success if they become active in protest activities. 
Though research on this subject remains incomplete, we find some empirical support for 
the political process model. For example, in their study of farm worker movements in the 
United States, Jenkins and Perrow (1977) concluded that increased outside support (both sym- 
bolic and concrete) due to changes in the political process, rather than changes in the level of 
discontent, were most important for the growth of the United Farm Workers movement in 
the 1960s. Jenkins and Perrow's data tend to support this argument, with one significant 
weakness; they assumed a consistent level of deprivation among farm labor. For an adequate 
empirical comparison of a political process model and deprivation theory such an assumption 
must be empirically demonstrated. 
In their historical analysis of "poor people's movements," Piven and Cloward (1977) make 
the same general argument. While continuing to stress the significance of a changing level of 
hardship in generating many collective challenges, Piven and Cloward (1977:9) also point to 
the support (or at least reduced opposition) for lower class groups that may result from a 
changed political environment. One elite faction may go to the lower class for electoral sup- 
port, and may even help define social movement goals and demands to gain this support. It 
was this new elite support, according to Piven and Cloward (1982, 1977, 1971), which helped 
account for the extensive mass protest by labor and the unemployed during the 1930s and by 
blacks during the 1950s and 1960s in the United States. 
McAdam's (1982) empirical research on the rise of the civil rights movement has also 
given support to a political process model as well as the psychological dimension of mobiliza- 
tion. While McAdam found that an increase in political opportunities was important, he also 
emphasized that "cognitive liberation" and "indigenous organization strength" were equally 
important factors in mobilizing insurgents. Cognitive liberation is the new attitude that 
movement member grievances are legitimate and that their push for social change can be 
successful. By indigenous organizational strength, we mean the capacity to recruit members 
and establish a communication network. All of these factors are seen by McAdam (1982:51) 
as interrelated, and the result of change in the political process; his data show these factors 
were crucial to the development of the civil rights movement. 
Explanations of industrial conflict have been moving in the same direction. Snyder 
(1975) shows that before World War II, political process changes, which provided political 
opportunities for achieving goals through strike activities, were more important in explaining 
strikes than were changes in economic conditions. From his finding that the "political party 
affiliation of Congressional and Presidential office holders have a strong impact on strike fluc- 
tuations from 1900 to 1948" in the United States, Snyder (1975:274) suggests that the "atti- 
tudes" of government officials toward labor influenced labor's ability to demand greater 
rewards from the capitalist class. These demands, in turn, often resulted in strikes. 
The major thrust of Tilly's "power struggles" theory (see Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly 1978; 
Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975) is that collective action and collective violence are the result of 
groups with conflicting interests mobilized by political crisis or the possibility of achieving 
demands during power changes. Major elections which are closely contested often provide 
the setting for such mobilization and thus, collective violence should be located around these 
particular election periods. Tilly's research, especially in France, does show some support for 
his power struggles theory (Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975). 
Finally, with respect to strikes and the social psychological dimensions of mobilization, 
Klandermans' (1984) study of strike participants found that workers' perceptions of the 
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chances that other workers would participate and that the strike would succeed all influenced 
whether or not individual workers would participate in a strike. Hirsch (1990) found similar 
social psychological variables important in understanding the mobilization of student 
protestors. 
Measures of Political Environment and Predicted Relationships 
Tarrow (1988) has recently pointed out the need for more theoretical and empirical work 
on the idea of political opportunities and the changes in political environment behind the 
development of social movements. He notes that political opportunities are most likely a 
cluster of variables, involving both objective and subjective (or psychological) factors. We 
agree with this view and stress the need for research with more specific measures of the 
different aspects of political environment to determine which aspects are more important for 
mobilizing social movement activity. A problem, of course, is that these precise measures are 
difficult to come by, and that several aspects of a change in political environment often occur 
together, making it difficult to determine which are most important in stimulating social 
movements. As pointed out earlier, previous attempts to measure the effects of political envi- 
ronment have not also adequately measured the level of hardship which may motivate move- 
ment activity. 
In addition to our analysis of the relationship between hardship (the level of unemploy- 
ment) and social movement activity by the unemployed, we have measured several aspects of 
political environment change cited in previous theory and research. Our measures of political 
environment change focus on the effects of elite statements about the problems of unemploy- 
ment and about programs to aid the unemployed, and elections. We measured types of elites 
and the extent to which they publicly acknowledged the issue of unemployment between 
1890 and 1940, thus helping legitimize unemployment as an issue. We also measured the 
extent to which elites publicly discussed specific welfare programs that if passed into law 
would aid the poor and unemployed. We included data on election years to examine the 
thesis that protest activity is clustered around election years. Most importantly with election 
years, we measured the extent to which these elections were contested, which indicates the 
chances of the political party out of power winning the election and carrying out political 
change. 
We expected to find that from 1890 to 1940, the level of unemployment itself was unre- 
lated to protest activity by the unemployed. Rather, protest by the unemployed should be- 
come more likely when unemployment is high and 1) the issue of unemployment is 
legitimized by elites, 2) specific programs to aid the unemployed are discussed by elites but 
have not yet been acted upon by the government, and 3) when contested elections in which 
both of the above conditions (1 and 2) occur. These specific changes in political environment 
give legitimacy to complaints by the unemployed. More importantly, though, they contribute 
to the realization that mobilization may be effective, because elites are actually discussing aid 
programs and political action taken in contested elections makes implementation of these 
programs even more likely. 
Data and Methods 
In contrast to industrial violence, researchers have no easily accessible source of data 
when attempting to measure collective protest by groups such as the unemployed. Following 
the approach of other researchers (e.g., Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; 
McAdam 1983; Paige 1975; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Stohl 1976; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975), we 
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take our data on protest by the unemployed and elite attitudes toward the unemployed pri- 
marily from the thoroughly indexed New York Times. In addition to extensive defense of the 
New York Times as a data source (see especially, Paige 1975), empirical examinations of the 
validity and reliability of data collection from major newspapers have also been conducted 
(see Danzger 1975; Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986; Olzak 1989; Snyder and Kelly 1977). This 
research has found newspaper sources for protest events generally acceptable and more com- 
plete than any other source. 
In our data collection procedure on protest events, research assistants examined the New 
York Times Index for the location of newspaper articles about these events from 1890 to 1940, 
read the original articles in the New York Times, and coded the necessary information. Only 
protest events primarily composed of the unemployed themselves (including public assistance 
recipients) were coded. This coding procedure excluded events that were primarily strikes or 
other collective actions by the employed. Some of these events in the 1930s (such as strikes) 
were on the behalf of the unemployed, but it was difficult to separate out the most important 
issue behind the strike. Specifically, under the subject-protest by the unemployed-we 
coded the number involved; the location, target, and goals of the action; and the number 
arrested, injured, and killed. A total of 303 protest events were located, read, and coded. 
To check coding accuracy, the authors randomly selected six years (1908, 1913, 1920, 
1921, 1922, and 1929) and followed the same coding procedures. The overall agreement rate 
was 89 percent. As another means of checking the accuracy of coding (and the essence of 
New York Times reportage), one of the authors selected key time periods and examined every 
page of the New York Times, reading articles related to our subject matter. This method was 
employed to make sure the New York Times Index was accurate and correctly utilized in this 
research. Reading the entire Index was impossible, but we found some key index headings 
most likely to contain the information required (especially "unemployment"). The years and 
months selected for this coding check were chosen because they were election years with high 
unemployment, but with very few protest events located by our coding procedure. The time 
periods examined were January to March 1894, August to November 1894, August to Novem- 
ber 1896, and August to November 1908. This method strongly confirmed the validity of our 
coding procedures. 
It is important to note some specific limitations of our data source for protest events. As 
might be expected, other studies (e.g.; Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986; Snyder and Kelly 1977) 
have shown that newspapers are somewhat selective in their coverage of collective violence 
and protest. Newspapers are more likely to run stories on bigger events, and events closer to 
the geographical area where the newspaper is published. Thus, our data are no doubt biased 
in these respects. For example, close to three-fourths of our protest events were in the North- 
east. But we have no reason to believe the Northeastern United States differed substantially 
with respect to protest by the unemployed. Probably the most important limitation of our 
data collection method was the underreporting of rural protest. Historical works on the 1930s 
suggest protest in rural areas was significant, but only 2 percent of our protest events were 
located in rural areas. We assume that New York City's level of protest was not unique, and 
that it can be used as an indicator of urban protest nationwide. 
We employed two other methods to check the accuracy of our data source for protest 
events. First, using the same key time periods previously noted for validity checks, every 
page of the San Francisco Chronicle was examined for reports of protest. Both the New York 
Times and San Francisco Chronicle included relatively small local events not found in the other 
newspaper; but the overall number of events, though often not the same protest events, were 
close for both newspapers. Second, reports given about collective protest by the unemployed in major historical works were checked against our New York Times data (these works included 
Feder 1936; Garraty 1978; Goldman 1953; Hofstader 1955; Keyssar 1986; Schlesinger 1957, 
1959, 1960; Piven and Cloward 1971, 1977). The New York Times data were very complete for 
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the total time period examined, and generally conformed to the descriptions of the magnitude 
of protest contained in these historical works. 
Our data collection procedure on elite attitudes toward the unemployed resembled our 
procedure for data collection on protest events. Research assistants located newspaper articles 
in the New York Times Index from 1890 to 1940 indicating that a specific person, official organi- 
zation (business group, religious group, or other voluntary organization), or government 
agency had voiced an opinion about conditions for the unemployed. The original New York 
Times article was then read, and the necessary information coded. In order to avoid inflating 
the relationship between protests and elite statements, separate groups of coders worked pn 
the two types of news information. Initially, our definition of elites and influential organiza- 
tions was very broad for the data collection process. Our working assumption was that if a 
statement about the unemployed by an individual or group was emphasized in the New York 
Times Index, the group or individual should be considered elite. This was not always the case, 
of course. Unfamiliar names were checked in biographical sources when articles provided 
insufficient information. The level of elite status was coded as city level, state level, or na- 
tional level for organizations, and for the position held in the case of individuals. Elites and 
organizations were also divided into institutional sectors (e.g., political, business, religious, 
charity, and other voluntary organizations). Each person's position and each organization's 
characteristics were coded, and a separate analysis was made for national level political elites 
(the president, vice-president, cabinet members, top federal government agencies, and mem- 
bers of congress). There was a strong correlation (r=.79) between the presence of statements 
by national political elites and all other elites on the national, state, and local level. State- 
ments made by labor leaders and labor organizations were excluded because it was assumed 
they were more directly tied to the unemployed and their statements about unemployment 
would be less likely to indicate any change in political environment. We were more con- 
cerned with the protest actions of the working and lower classes than with their statements. 
Overall, 1,526 elite statements were coded (598 of these by national level political elites). 
As with the protest data, six years were randomly selected for recoding by the authors to 
check the coding accuracy of elite statements. The coding of elite statements proved to be a 
very difficult process for the "big years" (i.e., those years with 100 to 200 or more news articles 
containing elite statements). The New York Times Index was not always clear on whether or 
not a statement by an individual or organization was in the news article. Thus, judgment 
errors were made by coders, but primarily in big years. As a result, elite statements for the big 
years were underestimated, which produces a conservative estimate of the impact of elite 
statements. The years selected for recoding by the authors were 1908, 1913, 1920, 1921, 1922, 
and 1934. Overall coder agreement was 67 percent, and 72 percent for national political elites 
only. Excluding 1934 (a big year), however, coding agreement was 78 percent overall, and 92 
percent for national level political elites. In addition, as in the case of protest data, we ex- 
amined the San Francisco Chronicle during the time periods with high unemployment but few 
elite statements (i.e., 1894, 1896, and 1908). This qualitative comparison indicated no signifi- 
cant differences in the reporting of elite statements by these two newspapers. We should also 
note that the pattern of elite recognition generally follows the descriptions of historians (Gar- 
raty 1978). 
Finally, the degree to which elections were closely contested was measured by the abso- 
lute value of the difference in votes cast for Republicans and Democrats for the House of 
Representatives (Thomas 1987). For off election years, values were interpolated from the elec- 
tion year data.2 
2. Originally, the research reported here was expected to employ generalized least squares, with the Cochrane- 
Orcutt method of correcting for autocorrelation effects (Hibbs 1974; Kmenta 1971; Ostrom 1978). However, as will be 
seen in the figures presented, such a time-series analysis would be misleading. Our data conform to the description by 
Isaac and Griffin (1989) of the instability of the findings when using time-series analysis if there is primarily one major 
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Findings 
Figure 1 shows that the high rate of unemployment from 1893 to 1898 was not accompa- 
nied by a massive increase in protest activity. "Coxey's Army" of unemployed who marched 
on Washington was active during this period (Beals 1968; Feder 1936; Piven and Cloward 
1977), but our data and the historical works report little other protest. For example, in his 
examination of the history of unemployment in Massachusetts, Keyssar (1986) describes a few 
protest activities in Boston during 1894 that were not picked up in our New York Times data, 
though we did include the one major demonstration on the Boston Commons that year. But 
most importantly, our data conform to Keyssar's (1986:222) conclusion that "during most 
years between 1870 and the early 1920s, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts did not witness 
any protests or demonstrations by unemployed workers. The protest movements that did 
arise, moreover, generally captured the support and allegiance of only a small proportion of 
the unemployed." In the two rather short recessions of 1908 and 1915, the data again show 
very little protest by the unemployed, and with the higher unemployment rates after World 
War I (reaching 11.9 percent in 1921) we find almost no reports of protest by the unemployed. 
From the very beginning of the Great Depression, however, the number of protests increased 
rapidly. In 1930, the unemployment rate had reached only 8.7 percent, but protest reached a 
point much higher than in any other previous period in our analysis, and continued racing 
upward until 1936. 
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Figure 1 * Protests and Unemployment Rate, 1890-1940 
This point must be emphasized-protest in the 1930s did not come after a prolonged level 
of high unemployment. It began from the very first year, before anyone knew that unemploy- 
ment would be almost 25 percent in three years. It is also important to note that the esti- 
mated number of protestors involved (over 100,000) in 1930 was, with one exception, higher 
period of change with respect to the variables measured for a longer historical period. By simply adding or dropping 
years from the period 1890 to 1940 we found wide swings in the regression figures, and thus could have selected a set of 
years that conformed to the findings we expected. As Isaac and Griffin (1989) point out, time-series analysis is designed 
to measure correlations over time, or trends in the relations between variables. But time-series analysis does not accu- 
rately model dramatic qualitative changes in history, for it incorrectly, in this case, presumes at least some continuity in 
historical events (see Isaac and Leicht 1990). 
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than in any other year in the 1930s.3 Thus, it is clear that the severity of the depression of the 
1930s was not the primary factor causing the massive level of protest; something happened 
prior to 1930 to set the stage for protest. Finally, after 1936, protest dropped rapidly, even in 
the face of an upturn in unemployment (reaching 19 percent in 1938). 
Why do we find a high level of protest by the unemployed only in the 1930s? Was there 
a significant change in "political opportunities," as suggested in Jenkins and Perrow's (1977) 
analysis of the farm workers' movement in the 1960s and McAdam's (1982) analysis of the 
civil rights movement? Before the 1920s we find little mention of the problems of the unem- 
ployed by elites, even when unemployment reached almost 19 percent in the early 1890s. 
During the 1920s, however, this changed dramatically. Figure 2 indicates at least one change 
in the political process beginning in the 1920s when elite statements about unemployment 
became very common even during periods of relatively low unemployment. 
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Figure 2 * Unemployment and Elite Statements, 1890-1940 
It is important to know if the politicization of unemployment occurred mainly on the 
level of local politics, primarily on the national level, or both. Figure 3 indicates that it was 
both: national level political figures as well as state and local elites were making statements 
about unemployment at about the same time in the 1920s and 1930s. There are some differ- 
ences indicated in Figure 3. In the election years of 1928 and 1930, but especially in 1928, 
national level elites took the lead in discussing the issue of unemployment. Interestingly, 
unemployment was first discussed extensively in a non-election year (1921), but then became 
a big issue next (with national elites especially) in 1928, an election year for the House, Senate, 
and presidency. It must also be noted, in 1928 unemployment was not even especially high. 
Nor was unemployment very high in 1930 (8 percent) when it was again a big national polit- 
ical issue, compared to unemployment levels two years later at the high point of the Depres- 
sion in 1932-1933. Thus, it seems clear that in 1928, and again in 1930 and 1932, 
3. Figure 1 presents only the number of protest events reported in the New York Times, rather than the estimated 
number of protestors involved. The estimated number of protestors reported involved in the annual total of each protest 
event in key years are as follows: 1894-500 protestors; 1908-4,800; 1914-3,500; 1922-450; 1930-102,500; 1931-10,800; 1932- 
63,700; 1933-73,450; 1934-19,900; 1935-41,300; 1936-29,400; 1937-49,400; 1938-39,250; 1939-113,900; 1940-670. The high 
number of protestors for 1939 was due to one nationwide protest in July by WPA workers protesting layoffs and cuts in 
the WPA program. 
BO/S AFFER
n any t er year s.3 , ar t severity depression
s s pri ary t r causing sive el protest; so ething happened
prior t stage protest. Finally, r , protest dropped rapidly, en
upturn unemployment (reaching percent 1938).
hy high el protest by une ployed only s7 re
significant change Upolitical opportunities," suggested ins rr 's (1977)
analysis r rkers' vement s dam's (1982) analysis
il rights vement? fore s e ttle ntion problems -
ployed by lit s, en hen une ployment hed ost percent early s.
uring s, ever, s changed dra atically. Figure icates st e change
political process beginning s hen ite tements ut unemployment
came very mon en during periods relatively une ployment.
lite ts loyment at~ ( rc t)
50.------------------------.30
5
oO~~_+___~~~"'*'*~~~~lIE_+~~**...L...L...L+...J.:..J.-¥=t~--L..I~LL~LL+_LJ
4
t--+~~--------------I4------~I--V---\-~~
1OOt---.---+----------~---~i.....--~--I
200 t-------------------~:o:__---l
r----------------------II-\-~-----l
t------j~-----------~----.,~~lt----,Pr-I
-- - t t nts --&- ne ploy ent t
Figure • ne ploy ent -1940
i portant w politicization unemployment cu red ainly
el al politics, pri arily tional el, r th. igure icates t s
th: tional el political figures l t d al ites ere a ing tements
ut unemployment ut e e s s. re e r-
es icated Figure ction years , t es ecially ,
tional el ites k ad discussing e une ployment. I t r stingly,
unemployment s u sed extensively -election year ( ), t n came
big e xt ( ith tional ites especially) , ction ear se, ate,
presidency. st t d, une ployment s t en ecially i h.
r s une ployment very high (8 percent) hen s a ain i tional lit-
l iss e, co pared une ployment els o years t r i h int r s-
i n -19 3. , s ar t , a ain ,
. Figure presents only r protest t reported ork i es, ti t
r f protestors i l ed. t r protestors reported lved
e ent i key years f ll : protestors; , ; ; -
63,700; 1933-73,450; 1934-19,900; - , ; - , ;
er f protestors f r ide protest July r t sti l
progra .
Lower Class Insurgency and Unemployment 147 
unemployment became a major political issue, especially for national level elites, whether or 
not unemployment was especially high. Before turning to other data it will be useful to ex- 
amine some of the explanations for the patterns found in Figures 2 and 3. 
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Figure 3 * National vs. Local Speeches, 1890-1940 
Piven and Cloward (1977, 1982) have argued that the working class and lower class 
groups were mobilized in the 1930s when the Democratic party sought the support of a new 
voter constituency. However, our data on elite statements indicate that at least some change 
in the political environment began in the 1920s. A revision of the Piven and Cloward thesis 
can be suggested. The progressive movement of the early 1900s helped elect a liberal Republi- 
can, Theodore Roosevelt, to the presidency, and then later provided a political base for Demo- 
crats (Goldman 1953; Hofstader 1955; Schlesinger 1957). In contrast to the earlier populist 
movement, the progressive movement was basically urban, and for the most part middle 
class. The major issues were economic concentration, big business dominance, local govern- 
ment corruption, and "robber barons." But the years after World War I brought an apparent 
collapse of the Progressive Era, and new conservative, Republican Presidents Harding, Coo- 
lidge, and Hoover. Not only did the Democrats lose the presidency in 1920, they lost control 
of both the House and Senate after the 1918 elections. Until the 1930s both bodies were con- 
trolled by Republicans, and by a big margin in the House. It was a time of extreme pro- 
business attitudes among political elites in power, and extensive repression of labor (Griffin, 
Wallace, and Rubin 1986) and of dissent in general (with the first major "red scare"). 
Ironically, our data show increased elite recognition of unemployment in the 1920s in 
spite of labor repression. This may be explained by the collapse of the progressive movement 
which was supporting the Democratic party before World War I. Major segments of the Dem- 
ocratic party began turning toward labor for political support (Schlesinger 1957), and one way 
to seek this support was through the politicization of working-class issues such as unemploy- 
ment. Figures 2 and 3 indicate that this was particularly true in the 1928 election. 
The data on elite statements is ambiguous on this point because both Republicans and 
Democrats made statements about unemployment. In fact, the issue of unemployment was 
first given extensive attention by Herbert Hoover in 1921 while he was Secretary of Com- 
merce. Hoover persuaded President Harding to stage the "President's Conference on Unem- 
ployment" which was chaired by Hoover. However, Harding opened the 1921 Conference 
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"by saying that the [1921] depression was inevitable, that anyone who thought planning 
might have averted it was deluding himself, and that, in particular, any plan involving gov- 
ernment spending would only increase the trouble" (Schlesinger 1957:85). It can be argued 
that while elements of the Democratic party were going after the working-class vote with 
concerned statements about the unemployed, Republicans could not be silent on the issue 
even though they took a negative view toward government action to reduce unemployment. 
As we would expect, when Democrats tried to court working-class voters, Republicans 
mounted a counteroffensive. Thus we find both negative and positive statements about the 
unemployed increasing or decreasing simultaneously. 
Whether or not this explanation is accepted, the data clearly show that unemployment 
became a major political issue for the first time in the 1920s, especially in the 1928, 1930, and 
1932 election years. This politicization of unemployment was not brought about by working- 
class revolt (as indicated by the low level of protest in the 1920s), nor did the politicization of 
unemployment prove to be an immediate stimulus to lower-class revolt. 
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Figure 4 * Speeches on Unemployment and Welfare, 1920-1935 
Figure 4 indicates that what was said about unemployment changed in the 1920s and 
1930s, and influenced the political environment and the possibilities for mobilizing the unem- 
ployed. In the early years of the 1920s, the problem of unemployment was discussed, but aid 
programs for the unemployed were not a significant issue. By the end of the 1920s, however, 
aid programs were more widely discussed. Not only was the issue of unemployment 
politicized, but by the end of the 1920s the more specific issue of aid to the unemployed was 
also politicized. When unemployment began to grow significantly in 1930, the unemployed 
were listening not just to abstract discussions about government responsibility but to discus- 
sions of what could and should be done to aid them. Government aid for the unemployed 
seemed to be a growing possibility, but not yet a reality (except in a very limited way on the 
local level). 
Finally, we must consider the impact of elections on protest activity by the unemployed. 
Figure 5 shows the absolute difference in votes cast for Republicans and Democrats (in mil- 
lions of votes) from 1896 to 1940. Non-election years were estimated from the previous and 
following voting years. During the 1920s we find that congressional elections were not very 
close. Republicans, except in 1922, won by large margins. But this started to change by the 
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Figure 5 * Protests and the Closeness of Congressional Elections: 1890-1940 
later years of the 1920s, with vote margins becoming much closer by 1930, until they reversed 
with big Democratic margins in Roosevelt's landslide victory in 1932. 
Tilly (1978) argues that social movements are more likely to occur during contested elec- 
tions, or times that offer hope for political change. Figures 4 and 5 support Tilly's argument 
with respect to protest by the unemployed from the very beginning of the Great Depression. 
We have shown that protest by the unemployed was not related to unemployment levels 
between 1890 and 1940, nor was massive protest by the unemployed due to the severity and 
length of the Great Depression. When unemployment was first politicized in the early 1920s, 
usually by national level elites, discussion of government responsibility for economic condi- 
tions and unemployment was mainly at an abstract level. Figures 4 and 5, however, show 
that by 1930 conditions existed which, following Tilly, would lead to mobilization of protest 
by the unemployed. Rather than abstract discussion about unemployment, the late 1920s, 
and especially 1930 and 1932, brought specific discussions of aid to the unemployed. This 
suggests that, from the very first year of the Great Depression, the unemployed felt a sense of 
hope or belief in expanded opportunity, a condition stressed by Tilly. They believed some- 
thing might actually be done to aid them. Moreover, by 1930 elections were again contested. 
The Republicans were no longer certain to control the federal government. Again, for the 
unemployed who had been told by conservative Republican politicians that nothing could be 
done, a ray of hope for activism may have appeared. 
Existing Social Movement Organizations 
Up to this point, our discussion has not touched on the effects of organizational efforts of 
various labor and left wing political groups during the late 1920s and early 1930s on protest 
activity by the unemployed. Recent critiques of the resource mobilization perspective have 
pointed out the neglect of face-to-face interaction in mobilizing movement participants 
(Hirsch 1990). 
Piven and Cloward (1977:68) stress the absence of extensive organizing among the unem- 
ployed during the early 1930s, and they make the controversial argument that this lack of 
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organization made it difficult for the "powers that be" to tame the movement. But there was 
some organization behind the rise of protest among the unemployed. Communist organiza- 
tions, for example, formed Unemployed Councils as early as 1929 (Piven and Cloward 
1977:68) to try to mobilize the unemployed. We find that these Unemployed Councils were 
important in the first protests in 1930. In fact, almost all of the protest activity indicated by 
our New York Times data during 1930 involved the Communist led Unemployed Councils, 
beginning with demonstrations in February of 1930 involving more than a thousand of the 
unemployed. In March, and especially during the summer months, similar demonstrations 
took place, though these demonstrations were smaller after February of 1930. 
As we move to 1931 and 1932, the number of protests reported by the New York Times as 
organized by Communist or Socialist organizations drops, and protests organized by other 
groups (or with no group given credit) increases. By 1932, few of the demonstrations were 
reported as organized by Communist groups, and by the summer of 1932 the Veterans' Bonus 
Army took most of the headlines. Throughout the first half of the 1930s, the constant theme 
in the protests was the demand for government aid for the unemployed; the demand for jobs 
was the next most common issue. 
Communist and Socialist organizations clearly helped mobilize the unemployed from the 
beginning of the 1930s. But a focus only on these organizational efforts tells us little about 
why massive protest by the unemployed for the first time in the history of the United States 
arose during the 1930s. In contrast to the 1930s, Communist groups tried to organize the 
unemployed during the 1920s with little success. For example, on February 12, 1922 a march 
for jobs led by a Communist group attracted between 200 and 300 participants. In January of 
1923 and December of 1924, small protests by the unemployed were reportedly organized by 
Socialists seeking government aid. But these were the only recorded protests by the unem- 
ployed in these years; no others were recorded until 1928. During July of 1928, there was a 
very small protest involving fewer than 50 participants, then another in March of 1929, also 
involving fewer than 50 participants. It is not until 1930 that we find widespread protest. 
Our data indicate that organizational work cannot be separated from the political envi- 
ronment of the time. The evidence strongly suggests that attempts to organize the unem- 
ployed at the beginning stages of the protest of the 1930s were only possible or successful 
because of the changes in political environment and opportunity described in this paper. We 
know that some attempts to organize the unemployed took place in even earlier periods of 
U.S. history (before the 1920s) with very little success (Garraty 1978; Keyssar 1986). 
Additional evidence of the value of organizational networks in mobilizing social move- 
ment participants is found in our data for the late 1930s. Figure 1 indicates the number of 
protestors involved in protest activity was at its highest point in 1939 (see footnote 3). Our 
data on the issues behind the protests clearly show that most of the protest in 1936 and 1939 
was carried out by former and current recipients of aid programs like those provided by the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA). In fact, the high number of protestors in 1939 can be 
primarily accounted for by one, highly organized, nationwide protest in July. In 1936, the 
year with the highest number of protests, slightly over half of all protests were by aid recipi- 
ents over the issue of cuts in welfare programs such as the WPA. Most of the other protests in 
1936 were calls for an increase in aid carried out by persons receiving some form of govern- 
ment assistance. Thus, protests in the late 1930s benefitted from the organization made possi- 
ble by welfare programs which brought the unemployed together. These later protests over 
cuts in New Deal programs are best described in Tilly's (1978) terms as "reactive movements" 
rather than the "proactive movements" of the earlier 1930s. The "proactive movements" in 
the early 1930s, which sought new opportunities in a changed political environment during 
elections, best fit Tilly's (1978) "power struggles" thesis of social movements. 
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Discussion 
Deprivation alone, as measured by the unemployment rate, is not sufficient to generate 
significant protest. This conclusion seems obvious from Figure 1. Extensive protest by the 
unemployed emerged with increasing unemployment for the first time in 1930. Yet this oc- 
curred when unemployment was not especially high compared to several other time periods 
from 1890 to 1940, and before it was clear that the Great Depression was under way. It was 
not extensive deprivation, which was yet to come, but some change in the political environ- 
ment which took place by 1930 that helped bring about mass mobilization of the unemployed 
for the first time. As pointed out in the beginning of this paper, however, the concept of 
political environment in the social movement literature is currently rather ambiguous. Tar- 
row (1988), for example, has noted that while political environment is an important variable 
effecting the mobilization of protest, the concept needs further specification and refinement. 
Political environment can refer to a cluster of variables, some of which involve material sup- 
port, while others imply attitudinal effects such as "cognitive liberation," "legitimation," or 
simply the realization by potential movement members that change is more possible than in 
previous periods. Still other aspects of political environment imply all of the above, such as 
Tilly's "power struggles" thesis which suggests that hope for change can help mobilize activ- 
ists. Tilly also cites tangible political shifts, such as less repression and support from political 
actors who see aid to the social movement as assisting in the defeat of political opponents. 
More research is needed to determine which elements of political environment are most im- 
portant, and even whether they can be measured separately, as opposed to being conceptual- 
ized as separate. 
The research reported here represents an attempt to settle some of these issues by measur- 
ing some often cited aspects of political environment and their connections to mobilization by 
the unemployed. Our findings, combined with those of some other researchers on this sub- 
ject, lead us to suggest that perceived opportunities for change among social movement members 
were the main stimuli for mobilization from the very beginning of the Great Depression. 
Legitimization of the issue of unemployment first occurred as early as 1921, and remained 
relatively high throughout the 1920s and 1930s. However, significant protest did not occur 
until 1930. By the end of the 1920s, but especially in the 1930 to 1932 period, two crucial 
factors came together for the first time with respect to the issue of unemployment. First, by 
the late 1920s, public statements by elites had moved beyond simple discussions of unemploy- 
ment as a problem to the actual means of aiding the unemployed. Second, beginning in the 
late 1920s, but especially in 1930, elections were again contested. Greater opportunities ex- 
isted to remove politicians who were not inclined to support aid programs. A third factor 
related to these two factors is found in research by Jenkins and Brents (1989), Quadagno 
(1984, 1988), and Domhoff (1990). In focusing on elite involvement in the development of 
1930s welfare programs, these researchers found that the elite was split over the issue of wel- 
fare aid. Our research, using the New York Times as a data source, indicates that non-elites 
should have been aware of this elite split and that new and expanded welfare programs 
would come only if the elite faction in favor of such programs was successful in shaping 
policy. Such a realization should have presented an opportunity and stimulus for mobilizing 
the unemployed. 
There is, of course, an old debate in the social movement literature over whether we 
should assume potential social movement members are primarily rational actors. The as- 
sumption of rationality need not be taken too far to argue that the combination of factors 
listed above was enough to suggest to potential social movement members (the unemployed) 
and their leaders that the possibility of change was present in 1930. With the very first rise in 
unemployment in 1930, the movement of the unemployed took off as never before in U.S. 
history. But this was not because prolonged or very high unemployment rates were creating 
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more hardship; rather, the impetus was the change in political environment outlined in this 
paper. 
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